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HERDING CATS? MANAGEMENT AND UNIVERSITY
PERFORMANCE*
John McCormack, Carol Propper and Sarah Smith
Using a tried and tested measure of management practices that has been shown to predict firm
performance, we survey nearly 250 departments across 100+ UK universities. We find large
differences in management scores across universities and that departments in older, research-
intensive universities score higher than departments in newer, more teaching-oriented universities.
We also find that management matters in universities. The scores, particularly with respect to
provision of incentives for staff recruitment, retention and promotion are correlated with both
teaching and research performance conditional on resources and past performance. Moreover, this
relationship holds for all universities, not just research-intensive ones.
‘There is a lot of difference in managing a group of employees in a plant and
(managing) faculty members,… Trying to manage faculty members is like
herding cats’
‘The reason why disputes in academia are so bitter is because the stakes are so
low’
The publication of the latest national and international university league tables
typically makes UK newspaper headlines. The performance of universities, in both
research and teaching, matters. Higher education is a strategically important sector
and there is evidence that investments in research-type education pay-off in areas,
which are close to the world technological frontier (Acemoglu, 2006; Aghion et al.,
2010). In a number of countries, government funding for universities is explicitly
linked to performance metrics, including research outputs (in the UK) and negotiated
performance targets (in the Netherlands). Many universities now compete in global
markets for both students and staff, who are likely to pay close attention to how
different institutions perform.
This raises the important question of what contributes to universities’ success.
Beyond the obvious importance of resources, Aghion et al. (2010) identified the
external environment, as measured by the degree of competition and autonomy from
central government control of decision-making, faced by universities in the US and
Europe as an important driver of performance in world rankings. In this article, we
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focus on the internal environment – arguably something that universities can better
control – and examine whether the quality of management within universities affects
their performance.
This follows a growing body of research that has demonstrated that good
management practices improve firm performance (for a recent summary see Bloom
et al., 2012). The underlying premise is that there are universally ‘good’ and ‘bad’
management practices and that these practices matter in a meaningful way for how an
organisation performs. This has been supported by empirical findings showing that
there is a wide dispersion in the quality of management practices and that differences
in (measured) managerial practices can explain part of the long-standing heteroge-
neity between organisations in performance (Black and Lynch, 2001; Bloom and Van
Reenen, 2007, 2010; Bloom et al., 2010). In this article, we examine whether the same
assumption is true of universities.
There is a commonly expressed view – illustrated by the quotes above – that
managing academics is, like herding cats, either impossible or pointless. Academics are
seen as differing from workers in most other organisations in ways that may make
management tools less effective. One difference is that academics are thought to have a
high degree of intrinsic motivation in relation to their work (i.e. they care directly
about their research and/or teaching). Besley and Ghatak (2005) and Benabou and
Tirole (2006) have emphasised that sharp incentives may not be as important or
effective when agents are motivated.1 Even when it comes to extrinsic motivations
among academics, many of these (such as academic status) are determined by a wider
peer group in the academic community, rather than being determined by an
academic’s department, faculty or university managers. This may make internal
management tools less effective. These perceived differences motivate our interest in
looking directly at management and performance in universities.
To collect information on management practices, we adopt the same tried and
tested survey tool originally developed by Bloom and Van Reenen (2007). We use this
tool to examine the relationship between management scores and a number of
externally collected measures of performance, covering both research and teaching.
Our focus is on a single country, the UK, to control the cross-country differences in the
institutional context. The UK provides a good ‘test bed’ for several reasons. First, the
university sector is important in the UK in terms of revenue, exports and contribution
to innovation.2 While US universities dominate global league tables, UK institutions
perform well compared to those outside the US. In the recent Academic Ranking of
World Universities (ARWU) ranking, 11 of the top 100 universities were in the UK,
compared to 58 in the US but only three in France and five in Germany. At the very top
of the international league table, the top 10 universities are split eight to two between
the US and the UK. This performance is, in spite of the fact that in the UK (private plus
1 Delfgaauw et al. (2011) find that management practices in not-for-profit organisations typically score
lower than management in comparable for-profit organisations in the social care sector and management is
less important in driving performance in not-for-profits.
2 The direct value of the sector to the economy has been estimated at £59 billion, this figure excluding the
huge potential contribution from research and innovation. Higher education is among the top 20 most
valuable export products in the UK generating around £2.2 billion in non-EU student tuition fees and an
estimated further £2.3 billion in off-campus expenditure.
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public) spending on tertiary education as a percentage of GDP (1.3%) is below the
OECD average (1.6%) and half the level that it is in the US (2.6%). Second, in
comparison to many European universities, those in the UK compete highly for both
students and research funding (Aghion et al., 2010) and there are ongoing major
reforms to funding for many of the UK Universities, which are only likely to increase the
degree of competition between institutions. Third, the performance of UK universities
has been subject to a high degree of external measurement and benchmarking for
nearly two decades. Performance measures cover both research and student satisfaction
and these measures are widely disseminated across producers and consumers and are
linked to public funding. Fourth, there is considerable diversity in the type of provider
within the university sector in the UK, a by-product of successive government’s attempts
to expand the uptake of higher education to lower income individuals.
To date, there has been relatively little quantitative evidence on university
management practices.3 A number of papers have looked at the cost efficiency of
administration in universities (Casu and Thanassoulis, 2006; Lu, 2012; Bayraktar et al.,
2013). Aghion et al. (2010) examine autonomy in decision making from local or
central government control but, in their cross-national sample, cannot separate this
out from competition. Moreover, their focus is on the external environment rather
than the internal organisation. Possibly closest to this study, Goodall (2006, 2009a, b)
explores the role of leaders in universities and, in particular, that of expert leaders. She
finds evidence that the appointment of strong academics at the top of the organisation
is associated with improved research performance at the university level. We do not
rule out the potential importance of leadership but our focus is on a set of core
operations-oriented management practices (monitoring of performance, setting
targets and use of incentives). We examine the academic discipline (departmental)
level, which enables us to examine variation in management practice scores both across
and within universities and look at how the scores correlate with external measures of
teaching and research performance, controlling for resources and past performance.
Our survey data reveal a number of interesting findings. We find a very low degree of
correlation in management practice scores across departments, compared to other
multi-plant firms and hospitals that have been studied. In other words, management
practices appear to be relatively heterogeneous within universities, although we find no
significant differences by academic discipline. When looking at the relationship with
performance, we find that management scores at the department level are more
important than management scores at the university level. We find clear differences
across universities, particularly by university type (older, research-intensive compared
to newer, more teaching-oriented). Management structures vary by type, particularly in
the degree to which management practices are decentralised, and management scores
vary by university type. Departments in older and more research-intensive universities
tend to be better managed than departments in newer and more teaching-focused
universities. The biggest difference is in managerial practices with respect to incentives
for recruitment and retention of staff.
3 Bloom et al. (2010) find that high school management is associated with better performance and at the
level of higher education, Aghion et al. (2010) provides descriptive evidence that university autonomy and
competition are associated with better outcomes in terms of research rankings.
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We also find that the management scores are strongly positively correlated with
externally assessed measures of performance in both research and teaching. This is
clearly shown in Figure 1, which summarises performance rankings (relative to the
median) by management score for an overall measure of performance (CUG),
research performance (RAE) and measure of student satisfaction (NSS). For all three
measures, a higher management score is correlated with better performance. In our
analysis, we show that these correlations are robust to including a number of controls
including those for the level of resources and past performance. We cannot rule out
that both management and current performance (conditional on past performance)
are related to some unobservable event but we can rule out anything that might affect
all aspects of management as the relationship with performance is driven primarily by
the quality of management practices on one dimension: with respect to provision of
incentives. Universities with high incentive scores perform well in terms of both
research and teaching but performance management and, in particular, targets are not
related to measured outcomes.
Finally, we find that the relationship between management scores and performance
holds for both research-intensive and newer, more teaching-focused universities. We
surmise that one reason why newer universities do not adopt the research-intensive
universities’ model may be limited competition between university types.
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Fig. 1. Mean Performance (Research and Teaching) by Management Score
Notes. CUG_rank refers to the department’s Combined University Guide ranking (reversed such
that a higher number indicates a better ranking). RAE_rank refers to the department’s ranking
in the Research Assessment Exercise (reversed such that a higher number indicates a better
ranking). NSS_rank refers to the department’s ranking in the National Student Survey (reversed
such that a higher number indicates a better ranking). The x-axis measures the department’s
overall management score (aggregating 17 individual indicators). The overall management score
is from 1–5; no department scored less than 2.
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We describe our sample and survey methodology in Section 1. Section 2 presents
some preliminary descriptive statistics, while Section 3 contains the main results on the
relationship between management and performance. Section 4 concludes.
1. Institutional Setting, Sample and Methodology
1.1. The Institutional Setting
The UK university sector comprises 158 institutions that have degree-awarding
powers. Most of these are not-for-profit.4 All undertake both research and teaching
but the balance between these activities varies. The main divide is between ‘old
universities’ (founded pre-1992) which are typically more research focused and ‘new
universities’, granted university status post-1992 as part of a government drive to
increase participation in degree-level education. However, there is also arguably a
further divide between the 24 most research-intensive older universities (known as ‘the
Russell Group’,5 which account for around 15% of the sector but 75% of all research
income) and other older universities, and also between newer universities that were
former polytechnics (which offered higher diplomas and degrees, often in more
technical subjects, that were governed and administered at the national level) and
those that were previously further education colleges.
Our analysis, therefore, separates four groups of universities. These are:
(i) The ‘Russell Group’;
(ii) ‘Other old’ universities, founded before 1992;
(iii) ‘Former polytechnics’;
(iv) ‘Other new’ universities (primarily former further and higher education
colleges and specialist colleges).
We show below that there are meaningful differences across the four groups. Full
details of the institutions in our sample and the four groupings are given in Table A1
in the Appendix.
In an international comparison, Aghion et al. (2010) identified UK universities as
having a high level of autonomy from government over budgets and hiring and a high
level of competition for funding for both research and teaching. Going forward, this
level of competition is set to increase. Recent reforms have allowed UK universities to
charge differential fees and at the same time reduced the student-based subsidies
provided to universities and eased the caps on (UK resident) undergraduate student
numbers.6 Arguably, however, the nature of the competition varies across universities.
Responses to our survey reveal that the research-intensive universities see themselves
competing in international and national markets (for staff and students) while newer
universities focus more on local markets.
4 Formally, most universities are charities although they are not regulated by the Charity Commission.
Private sector institutions include the University of Buckingham and, more recently, the College of Law and
BPP, providers of legal training that have recently been granted university status.
5 So called because the first informal meetings of the group took place in Russell Square in London.
6 Postgraduate student numbers are not capped.
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Undergraduate degrees in the UK typically involve three years’ full-time study (four in
Scotland) across all these university types. Currently, around 35% of UK resident
individuals attend university. Attendance at university is not a right for all individuals
who complete high school but is conditional on performance in national exams taken at
age 18 (17 in Scotland).7 In common with the US but in contrast tomuch of Continental
Europe, many UK resident students study away from home. Entry standards vary
considerably between universities and competition for places is very strong, particularly
at the elite research-orientated universities. Students from outside the UK make up a
significant proportion of the student body (around 14% of undergraduates and over
60% of postgraduates, UKCISA) and competition for these students is worldwide.
1.2. Our Sample
The population for this study consisted of universities that made a submission to the
most recent Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) carried out in 2008. This RAE involved
(the latest in a series of) peer-review assessments of the research outputs of academic
staff within a department, designed to produce a quality profile of the department for
the purposes of allocating research funding (more details in subsection 1.4). Our
selection of only RAE-submitting institutions was to provide an external performance
measure relating to research. It will tend to bias our sample to universities with at least
some research-active staff relative to the full population of institutions with degree-
awarding powers but, as shown in Table 1, our relevant population covers all four types
of universities (Russell Group, other old, former polytechnics and other new).
UK universities are generally organised into faculties covering broad groups of related
academic disciplines (for example, medicine, sciences, social sciences, arts) and, within
this, departments, whichcontaindiscipline-specific academics. Interviewswere carriedout
with heads of departments. We selected heads of departments as their key responsibilities
include recruitment and retention of staff and deployment of staff and other resources.
Rather than spreading our sample thinly across a large number of different
academic departments with relatively few observations for each, we deliberately focused
on four academic subjects – psychology, computer science, business & management
and English. These were chosen to cover the full range of disciplines (science,
humanities and social sciences) and because, as shown in Table 1, a relatively large
number of universities made an RAE submission in these subjects (76+), allowing us to
obtain reasonable sample sizes across the four university types. If we had chosen
economics, for example, the relevant population would have consisted of only 35
departments concentrated among Russell Group and other old universities. Business
and management gives us a larger and more diverse population of 90 departments.8 In
7 Compulsory schooling ends at age 16 in the UK. Secondary school ends at 18 and students wishing to go
to University have to achieve (high) standards in the examinations taken at the end of secondary school
(known as ‘A’ levels).
8 There are 60 universities which have a business and management department and no economics
department submitted to the RAE. For these, it is likely that the business and management department
includes some economists who would have been assessed by the economics and econometrics RAE sub-panel.
Their outputs and scores will have been taken into account in the overall departmental business and
management RAE score.
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fact, we show in our analysis that there are no significant differences in the
management scores across academic departments (university type is more important
in explaining variation across our sample). We, therefore, think it is likely that
surveying a different set of academic departments would yield similar results.
As shown in Table 1, a total of 120 universities had at least one of these four
academic departments submitting to the RAE 2008. We also surveyed human resource
(HR) departments in all the submitting universities to look at the relative importance
of management practices at the department and university level. For each university,
this gives a potential maximum of five observations, although it is clear from Table 1
that older universities typically have a higher number of RAE-submitting departments
than newer universities. Our final sample contains information on management
practices in 248 departments (including the HR department) within 112 UK
universities. Our sample includes 34 universities for which we observe only one
department, 38 for which we observe two, 25 for which we observe three, 12 for which
we observe four and three for which we observe all five.
1.3. The Management Practices Survey
To measure the quality of management practices we use an existing methodology that
has been used in manufacturing (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007), health (Bloom et al.,
2010) and the social care sector (Delfgaauw et al., 2011). Using an existing
methodology has a number of advantages. First, the survey has been extensively tried
and tested, successfully being used to survey several thousands of organisations in more
Table 1
Population and Sample Statistics
Number of universities Number of departments
Relevant
population
Our
sample
Relevant
population
Our
sample
University type
Russell Group 24 23 111 62
Other old universities 35 34 139 76
Former polytechnics 35 33 131 79
New universities 26 22 58 31
120 112 439 248
Departments
Business 90 55
Computer science 81 45
English 87 44
Psychology 76 47
Human resources 105 57
439 248
Notes. Relevant population comprises academic departments (business, computer science, English and
psychology) that made a submission to the 2008 Research Assessment Exercise, together with the human
resources department from universities that had at least one department submitting. Russell Group refers to
the 24 most research-intensive universities in the UK; other old universities refers to institutions that were
universities prior to 1992; former polytechnics refers to institutions that were polytechnics offering more
technical/vocational courses prior to 1992; new universities refers to other institutions that achieved
university status post-1992, often former higher education colleges.
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than 20 different countries. Second, following the same methodology and using a
common set of indicators allows us to set our results in a wider context.
The focus of the management survey is a set of operations-focused management
practices. The survey does not cover leadership or values, although these are likely to
also be important in explaining performance variation (Goodall, 2006, 2009a,b;
Stephan et al., 2011). At the core of our survey is a set of 17 indicators of management
practices, grouped into four subcategories as follows:
Operations
1 Standardised process: presence of clear processes for research development and
mentoring of junior staff.
2 Continuous improvement: processes (research/teaching) are reviewed and
opportunities for improvement are actively sought.
Monitoring
3 Performance tracking : the overall performance of the organisation (depart-
ment/university) is tracked using meaningful metrics and with appropriate
regularity.
4 Performance review: performance of individual members of staff is reviewed in a
comprehensive and systematic way.
5 Performance dialogue: individual performance review is well structured.
6 Consequence management: differing levels of personal performance lead to
different consequences.
7 Clarity/comparability: performance measures are easily understood and openly
communicated.
Targets
8 Target balance: there are meaningful targets for the organisation – in particular
beyond external processes such as the regular research assessment process.
9 Target interconnection: targets cascade well through the organisation and are
responsive to individual department needs.
10 Target horizon: the organisation is actively engaged in pursuing long-term goals,
with appropriate short-term targets.
11 Target stretch: targets are appropriately difficult to achieve.
Incentives
12 Rewarding high performers: good performance is rewarded proportionately.
13 Removing poor performers: organisation is able to deal with underperformers.
14 Promoting: promotion is performance based.
15 Managing talent: emphasis is put on talent management.
16 Retaining talent: organisation will go out of its way to keep its top talent.
17 Attracting talent: the organisation has a clear employee value proposition.
The set of indicators and related questions are provided in the online Appendix,
together with information on the scoring methodology. From this, it should be clear
that the survey is not designed as a simple question–answer survey. Instead, each
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indicator has a set of related questions designed to allow the interviewer to make a
reasonable assessment of the quality of management practices in the organisation. This
is based on open questions (i.e. ‘Can you tell me how you promote your employees’),
together with examples rather than closed questions (i.e. ‘Do you promote your
employees on tenure (yes/no)?’). The prompting questions (and examples) are
designed to allow the interviewer to understand the actual management practices in
the organisation. For each indicator, the interviewer reports a score between 1 and 5, a
higher score indicating a better performance.
The interviews were carried out during the Summer of 2012 by six students (five
from the University of Bristol and a recent graduate from Boston University), including
one first-year undergraduate, three third-year undergraduates, one student with a
Masters and one doing a PhD, spread across a number of departments (law, classics,
management, administration and biology). They undertook a two-day training
programme which had been designed by the original management interview team at
the London School of Economics. This training programme, together with paired
practice interviews, helped to ensure a consistent approach. The interview process was
project managed on a day-to-day basis by McCormack.
The interviews were independently double-scored by two interviewers, one conduct-
ing the interview, the other listening in.9 Any differences in scores were discussed and
reconciled at the end of the interview. If the difference in scores was two or more
(which was the case for 17 of a total of 3,757 indicator scores), there was a discussion
with the project manager. In 974 cases, the scores differed by one point with no
obvious patterns across interviewers or indicators. These smaller differences were
discussed and resolved by the two scorers. The double-scoring was to ensure that the
interviews and scoring are comparable across interviewers, although our regression
analysis additionally controls for interviewer fixed effects. Each interview took between
45–60 min.
To ensure unbiased responses, interviews were conducted by telephone without the
respondents being aware in advance that they were being scored, making it more likely
that the interviews genuinely captured actual management practices. In addition, the
interviewers were not given any metrics on the universities’ performance in advance of
the interview and nor were survey respondents asked for this information. These were
matched in from independent sources after the interviews were finished.
1.4. Measures of Performance
UK universities are monitored by independent public regulators on the basis of their
research and teaching performance, with much of this monitoring related to
performance at the departmental level. In addition, there are several independent
rankings which combine this performance information with other indicators. We use
three of these performance metrics in our analysis, focusing on departmental level
rankings. This is in contrast to earlier research that used only university level rankings
(Goodall, 2006, 2009a,b; Aghion et al., 2010).
9 Of the 248 interviews, 221 were double-scored.
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First, the Research Assessment Exercise (now Research Excellence Framework)
provides an assessment of the quality of research output of the academic staff
members at departmental (discipline) level. These quality profiles were intended to
provide objective, comparable measures of the department’s research performance as
assessed by peer reviewers. In principle, these measures are potentially comparable
across academic disciplines but we focus on relative performance within disciplines.
RAE results are available from 2008 and from 2001. We use ranking information,
reversing the rankings such that a higher number indicates a more highly ranked
department.
Second, we use an assessment of student satisfaction. This is measured by the
National Student Survey (NSS) satisfaction score, which has been collected annually
since 2005. We focus on responses to the question ‘Overall, I am satisfied with the
course’ (scored 1–5 where 1 indicates completely disagree and 5 indicates completely
agree). We normalise at the department level to allow for differences across disciplines.
Third, we use the ranking of the department according to independent university
guides. There are several of these in the UK: we focus on the Complete University
Guide (CUG) where rankings information is available at the department level over the
period 2008–13.10 These rankings are weighted indices covering research outputs,
student satisfaction, student outcomes and measures of resources. As this reflects both
teaching and research at departmental level, this is our key measure of output. Again,
we reverse the rankings such that a higher number reflects a better performance.
1.5. Other Controls
We include in our analyses, controls for resources at departmental and University level,
including the number of staff, students and expenditure. This includes both academic
spending per staff member that is a reasonable measure of (average) salary within a
department and other spending, which we normalise by number of students. These
measures of resources are derived from sources external to our respondents to the
management survey (mainly from the government regulators). Details are provided in
Table A2 in the Appendix. It is important to be able to control for resources in
exploring the link between management and performance. It means, for example that
better management in a department is not simply picking up a higher level of
resources. When it comes to the incentives scores, we can also rule out that better
hiring and promotion practices are simply allowing heads of departments to compete
more aggressively in terms of the academic salaries they can offer.
1.6. Differences Across Types of University
In Table 2 we show that the groupings of universities that we identify above (Russell
Group, other old, former polytechnics and other new) are meaningful, in terms of
there being significant differences in the performance of the departments, the
resources available, the markets they operate within and the management structures.
10 Our results are not guide specific: using the Guardian Guide rankings (available from 2011–3) yielded
similar results.
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First, there are significant differences in measures of research performance and
student satisfaction. The research-intensive (Russell Group) universities typically score
highest on measures of performance, followed by the other old universities, the former
polytechnics and the other new universities.
Second, there are clear differences in the level of resources across the university
types.11 As expected, the research-intensive universities have a higher level of resources
as measured by academic spending per staff member and other spending per student.
Staff–student ratios are also lower in these elite universities.
Third, there are differences in the markets in which the universities operate. The
older universities see themselves as competing internationally and nationally, while
Table 2
Sample Characteristics by University Type
Russell
Group
Other
old
Former
polytechnics
Other
new p-value N
Department characteristics
CUG 2013 ranking 16.5 33.4 67.1 85.5 0.000 169
RAE 2008 ranking 14.6 34.6 60.1 74.4 0.000 187
Student satisfaction score 2012 4.21 4.21 4.07 4.11 0.052 146
Number of staff 157.0 92.3 108.6 44.2 0.000 187
Number of students 1,158.8 1,483.4 2,318.0 970.0 0.000 191
Staff–student ratio 9.20 14.50 18.94 19.15 0.000 187
Academic spending per staff (z_score) 0.314 0.248 0.284 0.525 0.000 186
Professorial salaries (z_score) 0.606 0.216 1.157 0.291 0.000 87
Other spending per student (z_score) 0.720 0.067 0.355 0.713 0.000 191
Perception of UK competition 5.09 5.29 7.46 7.71 0.536 169
Perception of global competition 7.82 6.85 6.79 4.40 0.008 100
Main competition – international 0.111 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.232 175
Main competition – national 0.757 0.360 0.100 0.050 0.000 175
Main competition – local 0.133 0.640 0.900 0.950 0.000 175
Management characteristics
Female 0.291 0.206 0.371 0.391 0.096 191
Full time 0.187 0.196 0.262 0.304 0.630 188
From outside university 0.225 0.288 0.236 0.190 0.835 161
From academia 0.434 0.618 0.383 0.421 0.109 180
Tenure at university (years) 12.97 14.37 14.39 14.15 0.852 179
Tenure as head (years) 2.68 2.84 4.40 4.36 0.015 188
Whether fixed-term 0.913 0.796 0.241 0.238 0.000 179
Likely next job is academic 0.444 0.359 0.181 0.222 0.066 137
Likely next jobs is management 0.250 0.327 0.290 0.217 0.600 191
Likely next job is retirement 0.277 0.153 0.159 0.055 0.235 137
Centralised processes_operations 0.282 0.237 0.136 0.389 0.208 139
Centralised processes_monitoring 0.632 0.842 0.875 0.571 0.031 130
Centralised processes_incentives 0.333 0.455 0.786 0.667 0.002 46
Notes. For variable definitions see Table A2 in the Appendix. p-value refers to equality of means across
university types, controlling for department and clustering standard errors at the university level. Russell
Group refers to the 24 most research-intensive universities in the UK; other old university refers to
institutions that were universities prior to 1992; former polytechnic refers to institutions that were
polytechnics offering more technical/vocational courses prior to 1992; new university refers to other
institutions that achieved university status post-1992, often former higher education colleges.
11 This information is only available at the level of the cost centre, which is determined by the statistics
collection body (the Higher Education Statistics Authority) and typically aggregates across departments,
though the aggregation is below faculty level.
© 2013 The Authors.
The Economic Journal published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Royal Economic Society.
F544 TH E E CONOM I C J O U RN A L [ A U G U S T
the newer ones primarily see themselves as competing with other institutions
locally.12
Fourth, the summary statistics in Table 2 (collected as part of the survey) give some
indication of differences in management structures across the types of institutions. In
both groups of older universities, management is more typically a part-time role (where
the rest of the time is for academic activities) and fixed-term. While managers (heads
of department) at these universities are only slightly more likely to come directly from
an academic position than those at the new universities, they are much more likely to
return to being an academic (rather than a management role). This highlights
alternative routes to becoming head of department in the UK. In the first route (more
common in older universities) being head is a temporary administrative responsibility
that rotates among senior academic members of the department. In the other route
(more common in newer universities) being head of department is the first step of a
management career, on the way to a more senior faculty or university-level position.
These two types of managers may have very different objectives. In the first case, the
managers may try not only to minimise the cost of being head but also focus more on
what they think will enhance the academic environment of the department. In the
second case, the manager may pay closer attention to university-level management
policies. In the next Section, we look at whether manager characteristics are reflected
in different scores.
Finally, there are differences in the extent to which aspects of management are
centralised within universities. Across all types of university, operations (the organi-
sation of research and teaching) are largely left to departments. However, there are
clear differences with respect to ‘incentives’, where the old universities have more
decentralised processes than the new. In our analysis, we find there is a strong link
between decentralisation of incentives and the quality of this dimension management
practices. As we cannot differentiate between decentralisation and quality, our
interpretation is that good management practices in relation to incentives involve
decentralisation to the department level.
2. Variation in the Management Scores
We begin our analysis by describing the variation in the management scores.
2.1. Comparison with Other Sectors
By applying essentially the same survey to universities as was used to measure
management practices in manufacturing firms and hospitals, we can make some high-
level comparisons across these industries. Focusing on 15 of the 17 individual
indicators that are the most directly comparable,13 we find universities score relatively
highly (mean score = 3.24, SD = 0.476) compared to both manufacturing firms (mean
12 The question asked about competition without specifying whether this was competition for students or
in research performance.
13 The two operations indicators (and related questions) are fairly specific to each industry and are
excluded.
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score = 3.03, SD = 0.642) and hospitals (mean score = 2.45, SD = 0.612). We find the
greatest differences with manufacturing in relation to targets, possibly related to the
high level of benchmarking information in the UK higher education sector, and
incentives, which may reflect the importance of individual talent in research. However,
we do not put too much weight on this cross-sectoral comparison. Although we have
gone to some length to attempt comparability in scores across studies, we cannot
completely rule out some differences in scoring.
One difference that is more meaningful is the high degree of heterogeneity in
scores within universities compared to manufacturing firms and hospitals. In previous
studies, when several ‘plants’ were sampled from the same organisation, subsequent
analysis showed a high level of correlation between management scores within the
same organisation (0.530 for hospitals and 0.734 for manufacturing firms). Thus,
multi-plant sampling acted as a check on scoring of management quality but the
analysis focused on the organisation-level average. In the case of universities, however,
the degree of correlation in scores across departments within the same institution is
very low (0.086). This is the case even when we look at departments within institution
interviewed by the same interviewer (0.036). The high degree of heterogeneity may
well arise because departments within institutions essentially operate in separate
labour markets, some being national and others international, depending on the
academic standing of the department. Compared to manufacturing firms or
hospitals, many staff within a university department do not have skills that are
transferrable to other departments within the same institution (as distinct from
moving to the same department in another institution). Furthermore, in some
universities, departments also operate in different markets for students. Thus, we
focus our analysis on departments.14
2.2. Variation by Department and University Type
Across departments (Table 3, panel (a)), HR departments score more highly overall
than the academic departments. However, this higher overall score masks differences
across the sub-components of the management scores. The biggest positive gap in
favour of the HR departments is in ‘targets’; in ‘operations’ (processes for research
and teaching) the academic departments score higher. This ties in with the fact that
universities appear to decentralise these operations processes to the departments (as
shown in Table 2). Within academic departments, Business departments typically
score highest and English departments lowest but these inter-departmental differ-
ences are not significant within universities (i.e. controlling for university fixed
effects).
By contrast, there are sizeable differences in scores across university types which are
statistically significant, controlling for department type (Table 3, panel (b)). In terms
of the overall score, departments in research-intensive universities (the Russell Group)
score significantly higher than the rest, with an average score of 3.48. This is followed
by other old, then former polytechnics and finally the other new, where the average
14 In our analyses, we cluster standard errors by university.
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score is 3.19. Figure 2 shows that the management scores between the two types of new
universities are more dispersed with several departments performing quite poorly in
terms of their overall management score.
The higher overall management score among the research-intensive group univer-
sities is not driven by consistently better performance across all subgroups of scores.
There is no significant difference by university type in ‘targets’ and ‘operations’ and
while there are significant differences in ‘monitoring’, it is the other new universities
that score highest with a score of 3.43. The higher score in the research-intensive
universities is driven by ratings on the ‘incentives’ component of the management
practices scores. The incentives scores are the most dispersed across the university types
and there is a more than 1 SD difference in mean incentive scores between Russell
Group and other new universities. Table 4 presents the scores for the individual
indicators by university type. The Table shows there is only one incentives indicator
where there is no difference between the research-intensive university departments
and the rest and that is ‘removal of poor performers’. For this score, Russell Group
departments underperform relative to their scores on other incentive indicators,
suggesting this is an outlier to otherwise higher scores in this group of management
practices.
Table 3
Management Practice Scores by Department and University Type
Overall Operations Monitoring Targets Incentives
(a) By department
Business 3.34 3.90 3.38 3.36 3.11
(0.447) (0.531) (0.502) (0.641) (0.630)
Computer science 3.26 3.81 3.26 3.11 3.18
(0.374) (0.514) (0.470) (0.662) (0.529)
English 3.14 3.77 3.18 3.09 2.93
(0.429) (0.522) (0.448) (0.684) (0.558)
Psychology 3.24 3.78 3.25 3.26 3.03
(0.558) (0.690) (0.522) (0.801) (0.616)
University HR 3.45 3.55 3.36 3.68 3.35
(0.457) (0.801) (0.546) (0.563) (0.559)
p-value 0.063 0.088 0.429 0.002 0.105
p-value, academic departments only 0.278 0.723 0.414 0.179 0.602
(b) By university type
Russell Group 3.48 3.90 3.39 3.31 3.51
(0.432) (0.647) (0.448) (0.852) (0.464)
Other old university 3.29 3.72 3.21 3.25 3.22
(0.425) (0.579) (0.476) (0.623) (0.497)
Former polytechnic 3.21 3.77 3.24 3.38 2.89
(0.466) (0.619) (0.516) (0.626) (0.600)
New university 3.19 3.53 3.43 3.37 2.74
(0.496) (0.752) (0.594) (0.741) (0.537)
p-value 0.002 0.182 0.025 0.377 0.000
Notes. The p-value refers to test of equality of means, controlling for university and department fixed effects as
appropriate and clustering standard errors at the university level. Russell Group refers to the 24 most
research-intensive universities in the UK; other old university refers to institutions that were universities prior
to 1992; former polytechnic refers to institutions that were polytechnics offering more technical/vocational
courses prior to 1992; new university refers to other institutions that achieved university status post-1992,
often former higher education colleges.
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Fig. 2. Distribution of Overall Management Scores. (a) By Department and (b) By University Type
Notes. The x-axis measures the department’s overall management score (aggregating 17
individual indicators). The management score is from 1–5. Russell Group refers to the 24
most research intensive universities in the UK; other old universities refer to institutions that
were universities prior to 1992; former polytechnics refers to institutions that were polytechnics
offering more technical/vocational courses prior to 1992; new universities refers to other
institutions that achieved university status post-1992, often former higher education colleges.
© 2013 The Authors.
The Economic Journal published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Royal Economic Society.
F548 TH E E CONOM I C J O U RN A L [ A U G U S T
2.3. Accounting for Variation in Management Scores
What explains variation in management scores across universities? To what extent do
different scores across university types simply reflect differences in their other
characteristics, for example resources or the pressure felt by departments with respect
to volume of students?
Table 4
Scores for Individual Indicators by University Type
Russell
Group
Other
old
Former
polytechnics
New
universities p-value
Operations
1. Standardised process 3.97 3.82 3.90 3.58 0.112
(0.724) (0.706) (0.691) (0.672)
2. Continuous improvement 3.82 3.63 3.65 3.48 0.309
(0.758) (0.670) (0.752) (0.927)
Monitoring
3. Performance tracking 3.79 3.62 3.58 3.90 0.087
(0.681) (0.565) (0.744) (0.789)
4. Performance review 3.64 3.43 3.48 3.84 0.012
(0.603) (0.736) (0.677) (0.687)
5. Performance dialogue 3.71 3.51 3.58 3.71 0.275
(0.584) (0.825) (0.761) (0.782)
6. Consequence management 3.05 2.85 2.97 3.23 0.137
(0.762) (0.766) (0.784) (0.762)
7. Clarity/comparability 2.77 2.62 2.58 2.48 0.375
(0.818) (0.783) (0.727) (0.996)
Targets
8. Target breadth 3.19 3.16 3.19 3.32 0.737
(0.938) (0.694) (0.735) (0.748)
9. Target interconnection 3.56 3.48 3.59 3.55 0.660
(0.975) (0.985) (0.870) (1.090)
10. Target horizon 3.36 3.37 3.56 3.52 0.413
(1.017) (0.814) (1.009) (1.028)
11. Target stretch 3.15 3.04 3.19 3.10 0.608
(1.069) (0.876) (0.769) (1.044)
Incentives
12. Rewarding high performers 3.52 3.01 2.54 2.26 0.000
(0.882) (0.973) (1.047) (0.998)
13. Removing poor performers 2.84 2.73 2.72 2.81 0.683
(0.682) (0.782) (0.783) (0.654)
14. Promoting 3.60 3.62 3.30 3.29 0.015
(0.557) (0.652) (0.822) (0.782)
15. Managing talent 3.87 3.58 3.16 3.23 0.000
(0.639) (0.837) (0.823) (1.044)
16. Retaining talent 3.45 3.04 2.52 2.19 0.000
(0.969) (0.791) (0.904) (0.873)
17. Attracting talent 3.79 3.38 3.09 2.71 0.000
(0.749) (0.765) (0.804) (0.824)
Notes. The p-value refers to test of equality of means, controlling for department and clustering standard
errors at the university level. Russell Group refers to the 24 most research-intensive universities in the UK;
other old refers to institutions that were universities prior to 1992; former polytechnics, refers to
institutions that were polytechnics offering more technical/vocational courses prior to 1992; new
universities refers to other institutions that achieved university status post-1992, often former higher
education colleges.
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To explore this, we estimate the following linear regression:
Mij ¼ aþ c0Z1ij þ dZ2j þUni typej þ depti þ uij ; (1)
where Mij is the management z-score for department i in university j. We focus only on
academic (i.e. we exclude the HR) departments. We run separate regressions for the
overall score and for each of the main components (operations, monitoring, targets
and incentives). Z1 is a vector of controls at the department level including
characteristics of the manager (female, whether full-time manager, years’ tenure and
likely next role) and measures of departmental level resources (the number of staff,
the number of students, spending on academic staff and other spending). Previous
studies (Bloom et al., 2010) have shown competition to be an important determinant
of management practices, so we explore this by including measures of competition
(these are self-reported and were collected as part of the survey). Z2 is a vector of
controls at the university level, including the number of cost centres as defined by the
university regulator (to allow for the spread of the university across academic
disciplines) and an indicator for London, as several of the London universities share
central administration for degree awarding functions. We also include departmental
and interviewer fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the university level.
The results are reported in Table 5. Column (I) has no controls other than
university type, departmental and interviewer fixed effects. For university type, the
reference group is the research-intensive group of universities (Russell Group). This
column shows this group scores around 0.5 SD higher than all the other three types on
overall management score.
Moving from column (I) to (II) shows the effect of adding controls for manager
characteristics, resources, competition and London location. A number of the
manager characteristics variables enter significantly. Female heads of departments
score lower overall and, specifically, lower in relation to incentives. This is an
interesting finding, although we do not know for sure whether this reflects a genuine
difference or a gender difference in reporting. Full-time managers score lower,
particularly in relation to operations and incentives. Because this is a self-reported
measure referring to the time spent doing the job, one possibility is that worse
managers spend longer on management tasks. The manager’s next role also affects
how they perform. Managers who are likely to return to academia (the default
category) score lower in terms of their overall management score. The difference is
most pronounced in relation to operations and targets. The latter, in particular, are
likely to reflect university management policies and our findings are thus consistent
with managers anticipating a return to academia having fewer upward-looking career
concerns. The number of years as head of department is not significantly correlated
with any of the management scores.
Looking at the other controls, we find some significant variation in management
scores with our measures of resources, although this is not systematically the case for
all of the dimensions of management. London-based institutions score lower on
average.
Including these controls, we find no significant differences across types of
universities in the quality of management with respect to ‘operations’ (second set
of columns), ‘monitoring’ (third set of columns) or ‘targets’ (fourth set of columns).
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But on ‘incentives’, the research-intensive Russell Group score significantly better
than the other university types even with controls for resources. The new universities
each score over 1.3 SD below the research–intensive ones, with the other old group of
universities having a score between the most research-intensive and the new
universities (0.74 SD lower than the most research-intensive one). The difference
in management quality on ‘incentives’ drives significant differences in overall scores
between the research-intensive and the other old and former polytechnics. In
summary, the results in column (II) of Table 5 confirm that Russell Group
Table 5
Variation in Management Scores
Overall score Operations Monitoring
(I) (II) (III) (I) (II) (III) (I) (II) (III)
Other old 0.529** 0.550** 0.497 0.395* 0.301 0.589 0.360** 0.286 0.265
(0.180) (0.235) (0.424) (0.201) (0.217) (0.507) (0.168) (0.279) (0.415)
Former
polytechnics
0.575** 0.839** 0.876* 0.273 0.237 0.589 0.190 0.251 1.227**
(0.204) (0.252) (0.502) (0.210) (0.286) (0.534) (0.173) (0.294) (0.340)
New universities 0.565** 0.350 0.235 0.530* 0.021 0.112 0.181 0.644 0.123
(0.237) (0.377) (0.344) (0.273) (0.427) (0.575) (0.250) (0.458) (0.409)
Female manager 0.327* 0.098 0.162
(0.174) (0.188) (0.165)
Full-time
manager
0.413** 0.403* 0.163
(0.195) (0.209) (0.214)
Tenure_head
(years)
0.019 0.016 0.021
(0.030) (0.036) (0.021)
Next_
management
0.414** 0.420* 0.283
(0.188) (0.228) (0.188)
Next_retire 0.361 0.425 0.194
(0.294) (0.320) (0.309)
Next_dk 0.346 0.291 0.148
(0.220) (0.302) (0.202)
z_staff 0.109 0.025 0.066
(0.200) (0.149) (0.169)
z_students 0.153 0.113 0.028
(0.201) (0.219) (0.175)
z_academicspend 0.015 0.235** 0.122
(0.091) (0.101) (0.103)
z_otherspend 0.177 0.139 0.075
(0.139) (0.152) (0.124)
Competition
in UK
0.003 0.023 0.021
(0.017) (0.021) (0.018)
Competition
globally
0.497** 0.262 0.396*
(0.197) (0.205) (0.223)
# costcentres
(university)
0.242 0.723** 0.019
(0.260) (0.284) (0.269)
London 0.135 0.246 0.266
(0.218) (0.231) (0.233)
central_ops (0/1) 1.518** 0.774 1.151**
(0.511) (0.632) (0.442)
central_
monitoring
1.104** 0.088 1.107**
(0.392) (0.536) (0.521)
central_incentives 0.731** 0.691** 0.411
(0.348) (0.303) (0.348)
N 187 158 36 187 158 36 187 158 36
R2 0.080 0.143 0.517 0.040 0.143 0.341 0.060 0.153 0.448
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universities score better on incentives and that this does not simply reflect their
higher level of resources.
Column (III) of Table 5 reports an additional specification in which we explore the
link between management practices and the extent to which management processes
are centralised within the university (this information was collected as part of our
Targets Incentives
(I) (II) (III) (I) (II) (III)
Other old 0.212 0.230 0.431 0.624** 0.739** 0.330
(0.209) (0.198) (0.489) (0.163) (0.247) (0.322)
Former polytechnics 0.005 0.143 0.725 1.018** 1.417** 0.332
(0.216) (0.222) (0.596) (0.196) (0.268) (0.406)
New universities 0.013 0.140 0.686 1.217** 1.329** 0.261
(0.252) (0.396) (0.472) (0.200) (0.324) (0.296)
Female manager 0.187 0.413**
(0.179) (0.172)
Full-time manager 0.300 0.342*
(0.211) (0.184)
Tenure_head (years) 0.013 0.017
(0.024) (0.029)
Next_management 0.476** 0.195
(0.205) (0.168)
Next_retire 0.498 0.125
(0.315) (0.252)
Next_dk 0.518** 0.119
(0.249) (0.203)
z_staff 0.144 0.063
(0.178) (0.173)
z_students 0.122 0.251
(0.195) (0.167)
z_academicspend 0.078 0.055
(0.086) (0.094)
z_otherspend 0.244* 0.088
(0.130) (0.123)
Competition in UK 0.011 0.021
(0.018) (0.020)
Competition globally 0.412** 0.470**
(0.161) (0.206)
# costcentres (university) 0.162 0.191
(0.256) (0.265)
London 0.013 0.154
(0.237) (0.220)
central_ops (0/1) 1.628** 0.980**
(0.627) (0.405)
central_monitoring 0.960* 0.844**
(0.474) (0.383)
central_incentives 0.433 0.686**
(0.387) (0.301)
N 187 158 36 187 158 36
R2 0.028 0.098 0.479 0.268 0.315 0.546
Notes. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. Standard errors are clustered at the university level. For variable
definitions see Table A2 in the Appendix. Regressions additionally include department and interviewer fixed
effects.
Table 5
(Continued)
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survey in addition to the management practices questions). We focus on centralisation
of three aspects of management: monitoring, operations and targets. The questions
were not asked in all cases and so the sample sizes are therefore, considerably smaller.
We, therefore, run a simpler specification excluding the controls for manager
characteristics, resources, competition and London location. The results in column
(III) suggest that centralisation – and what is centralised – is important. Centralisation
of ‘operations’ has an overall positive effect on the overall scores, raising them by just
over 1.5 of a SD. However, centralisation of ‘incentives’ has the opposite effect – it
reduces the departmental scores – and this reduction is significant for the incentives
scores (where it lowers them by nearly three quarters of a SD), the operations scores (a
reduction of 0.36 of a SD) and the overall management practices score (a reduction of
0.731). Universities that decentralise incentives to the department level score more
highly and this decentralisation is more common in the elite universities than other
types of universities. Our interpretation of these findings is that the quality of
incentives management within universities is inherently linked to decentralised
incentives processes.15 This finding echoes the earlier findings from Aghion et al.
(2010), which looked across, rather than within, country.
3. Does Management Matter?
We have shown that there are significant differences in management scores across
universities. We now turn to address the key question of whether this matters for
performance. While we cannot establish causality in a single cross section, we control
for observable differences in resources and condition on past performance, allowing us
to control for university and departmental-level factors, which have a time-invariant
effect on output.
3.1. The Raw Association with Performance
More detailed than Figure 1, Figure 3 provides visual evidence of the raw correlations
between management scores and the measures of performance within the sample as a
whole. The top left panel presents the association at departmental level between the
overall management score and the CUG ranking (which incorporates both teaching
and research assessments). While there is dispersion, the Figure shows the
relationship at the mean is positive. The top right panel focuses on research output,
while the bottom panel focuses on student satisfaction. Higher management practices
scores are associated with better performance for both research and teaching
assessments.
15 Our centralised management score is from the survey. Given this, an alternative explanation is that
university managers who are poor managers blame this on centralised management. But this interpretation is
not supported by the difference in the association of different aspects of management with the centralisation
measures.
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3.2. Allowing for Differences in Resources and Controlling for Past Performance
To explore the relationship between management and performance further, we
control for differences in resources and attempt to mop up unobserved heterogeneity
by additionally controlling for past performance.
We estimate the following regressions:
Yij ¼ aþ uMij þ c0Z1ij þ dZ2j þ cZij ;t5 þ Uni typej þ depti þ uij ; (2)
where Yijt refers to a performance measure. We run separate regressions for the CUG
ranking, the RAE ranking and the NSS score. In each case, we use the most recent
measure, although in the case of the RAE ranking, this is last available for 2008. We
include the same controls as before (Z1 and Z2). We estimate (2) without and with lagged
performance, the latter specification allowing us to control for unobservable depart-
ment- and university-level factors, which have a time-invariant effect on performance.
We choose the five-year lag to allow management to be correlated with changes in
performance over a reasonable period. Choosing other lags yields similar results.
The main results are summarised in Table 6. Column (I) shows the correlations
including only interviewer fixed effects. Column (II) adds controls for manager,
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Fig. 3. Overall Management Score and Performance
Notes. Management score refers to the department’s overall management score (aggregating 17
individual indicators). CUG ranking refers to the department’s Combined University Guide
ranking (reversed such that a higher number indicates a better ranking). RAE ranking refers to
the department’s ranking in the Research Assessment Exercise (reversed such that a higher
number indicates a better ranking). NSS score refers to the department’s student satisfaction
score in the National Student Survey.
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department and university characteristics, as well as indicators for university type. The
results confirm that, even within university type and conditional on resources, the
management score has a significant and positive effect for CUG and RAE rankings. For
NSS scores, the coefficient is positive but not significant. Column III adds a further
control for lagged performance. In this specification, the overall management z_score
is now positive and significant in regressions for all three performance measures.
Controlling for both university type and past performance, a 1 SD improvement in
management score is correlated with a 2.74 improvement in the CUG ranking, a 2.49
improvement in the RAE ranking and a 0.14 SD improvement in the NSS score. While
we cannot give this a strict causal interpretation, these results clearly signal that
management is at least part of the story for why departments perform well.
Table 6
Relationship Between Overall Management Score and Performance
CUG ranking (reversed) RAE ranking (reversed)
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (I) (II) (III) (IV)
z_managscore 6.783** 3.809** 2.740** 5.157** 2.658** 2.489**
(2.534) (1.623) (1.333) (2.156) (1.240) (1.138)
z_managscore_
HR
2.345 1.208
(1.658) (2.172)
Female
manager
2.066 1.050 2.088 0.436 1.409 1.414
(2.801) (2.364) (3.148) (2.174) (2.315) (3.955)
Full-time
manager
1.644 2.375 7.736** 0.054 2.623 4.357
(3.471) (2.692) (3.378) (2.325) (2.402) (3.385)
Tenure_head
(years)
0.354 0.362 0.846** 0.204 0.121 0.289
(0.446) (0.359) (0.404) (0.428) (0.384) (0.503)
Next_
management
6.011* 2.486 5.488 4.049 4.338* 3.290
(3.080) (2.433) (4.019) (2.794) (2.441) (3.971)
Next_retire 10.169** 10.026** 6.574 3.276 2.448 1.861
(4.646) (3.641) (4.713) (3.850) (4.310) (6.311)
Next_dk 2.746 3.254 1.517 4.243 3.086 1.764
(3.394) (2.906) (4.478) (3.813) (3.380) (4.206)
z_staff 6.364** 2.751 3.994 8.245** 4.669** 1.922
(2.607) (2.039) (3.601) (2.092) (1.968) (3.672)
z_students 8.071** 4.377* 6.241** 2.780 0.950 1.834
(2.706) (2.358) (3.031) (1.745) (1.742) (3.281)
z_acspend 1.074 0.809 1.661 0.328 0.298 2.306
(1.740) (1.348) (1.718) (1.292) (1.176) (1.581)
z_oth_spend 1.954 1.342 0.995 1.467 1.130 3.170
(2.683) (1.707) (2.352) (1.500) (1.162) (2.445)
Competition
in UK
1.090** 0.438 0.048 0.481 0.367 0.540
(0.461) (0.345) (0.268) (0.342) (0.349) (0.426)
Competition
globally
6.133 0.725 0.482 4.320 3.754 11.479
(4.595) (3.713) (4.994) (4.504) (4.878) (6.813)
Other old 15.451** 8.106** 6.645** 11.554** 8.124** 1.305
(4.645) (3.458) (2.961) (3.795) (3.425) (4.313)
Former
polytechnics
39.832** 16.147** 11.017* 34.858** 25.872** 10.817*
(4.759) (4.785) (6.037) (4.603) (4.895) (6.306)
New universities 69.177** 38.160** 36.495** 45.961** 36.811** 26.273**
(7.454) (8.964) (7.223) (5.506) (5.766) (9.044)
Past
performance
0.587** 0.756** 0.325** 0.519**
(0.090) (0.092) (0.080) (0.110)
N 165 141 141 73 183 154 136 72
R2 0.072 0.764 0.845 0.914 0.064 0.770 0.821 0.866
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3.3. What Level and Aspects of Management Seem to Matter for Performance?
Column (IV) of Table 6 replaces the departmental level management score with the
management score for the HR department in the university. The idea is to see
whether it is management at the department level that matters and/or management
at the university-level. Our sample is smaller as not all the HR departments were
sampled. The results clearly show that management practices in the HR department
NSS score (z_score)
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
z_managscore 0.134 0.111 0.141*
(0.083) (0.097) (0.084)
z_managscore_HR 0.091
(0.231)
Female manager 0.150 0.026 0.060
(0.174) (0.201) (0.405)
Full-time manager 0.322* 0.171 0.272
(0.193) (0.187) (0.382)
Tenure_head (years) 0.004 0.008 0.012
(0.033) (0.026) (0.053)
Next_management 0.004 0.012 0.356
(0.246) (0.233) (0.346)
Next_retire 0.246 0.184 0.366
(0.326) (0.328) (0.548)
Next_dk 0.058 0.184 0.000
(0.258) (0.218) (0.267)
z_staff 0.146 0.080 0.041
(0.133) (0.125) (0.324)
z_students 0.388** 0.215 0.077
(0.184) (0.189) (0.332)
z_acspend 0.006 0.053 0.308*
(0.091) (0.102) (0.154)
z_oth_spend 0.225* 0.098 0.309
(0.127) (0.158) (0.311)
Competition in UK 0.025 0.021 0.076
(0.035) (0.026) (0.057)
Competition globally 0.183 0.114 0.416
(0.325) (0.292) (0.648)
Other old 0.563 0.514* 0.255
(0.358) (0.305) (0.510)
Former polytechnics 0.142 0.184 0.610
(0.311) (0.302) (0.532)
New universities 0.464 0.154 1.501
(0.571) (0.493) (0.942)
Past performance 0.257** 0.209
(0.087) (0.197)
N 143 121 110 55
R2 0.038 0.259 0.293 0.436
Notes. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. Standard errors are clustered at the university level. For variable
definitions see Table A2 in the Appendix. Regressions also include department type and interviewer fixed
effects. CUG, Complete University Guide; RAE, Research Assessment Exercise; NSS, National Student Survey.
Table 6
(Continued)
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(which we take to be a measure of the quality of central university management) are
not important in determining departmental performance. The coefficients on the
management practices of the HR department are all negative, albeit not statistically
significant. The quality of management practices at the centre does not matter for
departmental-level measures of performance in research or teaching.
These results strongly indicate that it is management at the department level that
matters for measures of department performance. We explore this further looking at
whether there is an association between central management practices and
university-level performance measures. We use the ARWU ranking of world
universities and the CUG ranking of universities in the UK. We regress these
performance measures on two alternative university-level management scores. The
first reflects the departmental scores and is the average of the management scores
among the academic departments. The second is a university level measure and is
the HR department management score. Table 7 contains the results. The columns
labelled (I) present the former, the columns labelled (II) the latter. The results for
the ARWU ranking show that management at the academic department level is
relatively more important than university-level management in explaining (positive)
performance. The former is associated with a 27.4 point increase in the world
ranking, while the latter is associated with a 43.4 point fall. For the CUG ranking, the
university level score is associated with a 4.3 point fall in the position in the rankings.
These findings suggest that what the HR department does is not associated with
increases in performance.
We now turn to the association between the measures of department-level
performance and individual subgroups of management practice scores. Figure 4
shows that the overall university ranking (our preferred measure since it combines
both research and teaching) is most strongly associated with the use of incentives.
Table 8 confirms and examines this in a regression framework. We run the same
specification as stated earlier (2) to look at the relationship between performance and
Table 7
Relationship Between Overall Management Score and University-level Performance
ARWU ranking (reversed) CUG ranking (reversed)
(I) (II) (I) (II)
Mean z-score academic
depts
27.440* 1.095
16.271 1.644
z_HRmanagscore 42.374** 4.286**
9.260 1.546
Lagged performance 1.392** 1.268** 0.789** 0.905**
0.127 0.096 0.098 0.100
N 104 56 86 43
R2 0.52 0.55 0.84 0.92
Notes. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. Analyses at university level. Regressions additionally include
indicators for university type. For Academic Ranking of World Universities we run Tobit regressions because
many universities are left censored at 800. ARWU, Academic Ranking of World Universities; CUG,
Complete University Guide.
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management scores but we now include the all four subgroups of the overall
management practices score in a ‘horse race’ to see which has the strongest association
with performance. All regressions include the full set of controls as in Table 6 column
(II) but we show only the coefficients on the management scores.
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Fig. 4. Management Score – Sub-components and Performance
Note. CUG ranking refers to the department’s Combined University Guide ranking (reversed
such that a higher number indicates a better ranking).
Table 8
Relationship Between Subgroups of Management Scores and Performance
CUG ranking
(reversed)
RAE ranking
(reversed)
NSS score
(z_score)
z_manag_operations 2.201 2.203* 0.146
(1.551) (1.286) (0.100)
z_manag_monitoring 0.045 2.305 0.025
(2.195) (1.390) (0.120)
z_manag_targets 1.818 0.600 0.006
(1.711) (1.517) (0.141)
z_manag_incentives 3.802* 3.455* 0.100
(2.219) (1.845) (0.109)
N 165 183 143
R2 0.712 0.699 0.114
Notes. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. Standard errors are clustered at the university level. Regressions also
include full set of controls as Table 6, column (II). CUG, Complete University Guide; RAE, Research
Assessment Exercise; NSS, National Student Survey.
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The results confirm that the subgroup of scores for incentives are the most
consistently associated with performance. The incentive score enters positively and
significantly for both the CUG and RAE rankings, increasing these by 3.8 and 3.5
respectively. There is evidence that operations also matter. The operations score is
positive and significant for the RAE ranking (though smaller than for incentives) and it
has the highest (though not significant) coefficient for NSS scores. The coefficients on
monitoring and targets are negative (albeit insignificant) for all outcomes. These two
aspects of management practices do not appear to matter for performance in either
research or teaching.
3.4. Do Different Aspects of Management Matter in Different Types of University?
The results so far have shown that better management practices at departmental
level are associated with better performance and that practices with respect to
incentives matter most. However, it is possible that for the newer universities, where
international reputation is less important than local reputation and teaching is
more important for income than research, freedom to recruit and retain matter less
and perhaps other aspects of management matter more. These universities have
historically been subject to greater central control and less autonomy at both
departmental level and university level, as many of these were previously part of
Table 9
Overall Management Scores and Performance by Type of University
Overall score Operations Monitoring
CUG RAE NSS CUG RAE NSS CUG RAE NSS
z_score 3.295 2.068 0.148 7.267** 2.608 0.164 3.946* 0.410 0.017
(2.646) (2.173) (0.155) (2.366) (1.689) (0.147) (2.072) (1.798) (0.153)
z_score_new 0.846 1.031 0.069 4.538 1.303 0.023 2.701 2.498 0.058
(3.374) (2.571) (0.181) (2.792) (2.144) (0.165) (3.152) (2.644) (0.190)
N 141 154 121 141 154 121 141 154 121
R2 0.764 0.770 0.260 0.772 0.767 0.277 0.758 0.765 0.250
Targets Incentives
CUG RAE NSS CUG RAE NSS
z_score 1.325 2.227 0.278* 1.805 2.255 0.045
(2.745) (2.052) (0.160) (2.627) (2.471) (0.127)
z_score_new 1.005 0.300 0.315* 5.175 2.136 0.145
(3.337) (2.425) (0.187) (3.457) (2.768) (0.172)
N 141 154 121 141 154 121
R2 0.755 0.767 0.276 0.771 0.773 0.262
Notes. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. Standard errors are clustered at the university level. Performance
measures as in previous regressions. All regressions include full set of controls as in Table 6, column (II).
CUG, Complete University Guide; RAE, Research Assessment Exercise; NSS, National Student Survey.
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local government and adopted faculty level structures sooner than the older
universities. It may be that monitoring and targets have greater returns in these
settings.
We explore this in Table 9, which presents the associations between the manage-
ment scores (both overall and subgroups) and the three sets of outcomes for different
types of university. We estimate the same specification as stated earlier (2) but we
include an additional interaction term between the management score and an
indicator for ‘new universities’, combining both former polytechnics and other new
universities. We include the full set of controls as in column II of Table 6. In this Table,
the coefficient on the management score captures the association between manage-
ment and performance for older (pre-1992) universities. The interaction term captures
any difference in the association for newer universities.
None of the results provides any support for the idea that incentives matter less in
newer universities. There is little clear difference between old and new universities in
the association between overall score and performance. Operations scores matter less
and targets matter significantly less for teaching in newer universities. However,
incentives appear to matter more in newer universities than in older universities.
The coefficient on the interaction term between incentives and being a new university
is 5.2 points higher for the CUG ranking and 2.2 points higher for the RAE ranking,
though neither are significantly different from zero.
This raises the question of why newer universities do not adopt the same model as
the more successful older universities. One plausible explanation is the fact that
there is relatively limited competition across university types. The markets that
Russell Group universities are competing in (for both staff and students) are
national and increasingly international while newer, more teaching intensive
universities see their primary competition in local terms. The lack of direct
competition would tend to reduce the pressure on newer universities to adopt
models of other university types. This explanation would be in line with the findings
of previous management studies on the importance of competition in driving
management scores (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Bloom et al., 2010). It would
also echo Aghion et al. (2010), who found ( joint) importance of competition and
autonomy in driving performance.
4. Discussion and Conclusions
This article has examined whether management differences between universities are
associated with differences in their performance. Using the UK as a test bed and a tried
and tested measure of management performance, we have shown wide variation in the
management quality across universities. In particular, we have shown differences in
scores between older, research-intensive universities and newer, more teaching-
oriented universities. In addition, we have shown that these differences are associated
with differences in performance. Higher management scores are associated with better
performance on externally validated measures of both research and teaching (often
seen, in this sector, as orthogonal to each other). These results are robust to controls
for resources (academic and non-academic spending and staff/student ratios) and to
lagged performance.
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We find significant differences in the management practices at the ‘plant’ level
within the firms – one department within a university might be well managed while
another is not. And we also find that the management of the central administration –
as measured by the human resources department – is very weakly correlated with better
output at departmental and university level. Management in universities is also
relatively heterogeneous relative to other organisations (e.g. manufacturing firms,
hospitals).
We also find significant differences between aspects of good management practices.
Good practice with respect to incentives – the freedom to retain, attract and reward
good performers – is the most important correlate of good performance. The setting of
targets and monitoring has a much weaker association with good performance.
Furthermore, the relationships we find hold for both world leading research-intensive
universities and those more focused on teaching. We suggest that limited competition
between university types may explain why newer universities do not adopt the
management model of elite research-oriented universities. Our findings, therefore,
build directly on Aghion et al. (2010), who found that market incentives, in the shape
of competition, and autonomy from central government control, mattered for
universities across Europe and the US. Our results suggest that management structures
which allow freedom to use incentives and autonomy at the plant (departmental) level
matters for output in this sector; competition may be a factor in adoption of this
model.
We have only a single cross section so do not claim causality, but we are able to
condition on resources and past performance to deal with unobserved heterogeneity
that might jointly explain both management score and current performance. In
addition, two aspects of our findings suggest that the strongly patterned set of
associations we find may be robust to endogeneity bias. First, the fact that the different
aspects of management practice correlate differently with performance suggest that
shocks to performance do not lead to the adoption of the whole ‘new management’ set
of practices including monitoring, target setting and use of incentives. Second, if better
management were put in as a response to negative shocks, this might explain our
findings of a positive association between changes in performance and better use of
incentives. However, this would mean that departments with negative shocks (poor
student performance or poor research performance) were given greater freedom to
use/decide how they retained, recruited and dealt with poor performers, while not
having any changes to the extent to which performance was monitored or targeted.
This seems somewhat unlikely. And thus, in summary, we think our results are not
driven by reverse causality but point to the important aspects of good management in
the use of incentives at the plant (departmental) level to motivate academics. This
contrasts the commonly held view that these individuals are impervious to good (or
bad) management.
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Appendix A.
Table A1
Universities by Type
Russell Group Other old Former polytechnics Other new
Cardiff University Aberystwyth University Anglia Ruskin
University
Bath Spa University
Imperial College London Aston University Birmingham City
University
Bishop Grosseteste
University
College, Lincoln
King’s College London Bangor University Bournemouth University Buckinghamshire New
University
London School of
Economics and Political
Science
Birkbeck College Coventry University Canterbury Christ Church
University
Queen Mary, University
of London
Brunel University De Montfort University Edge Hill University
Queen’s University Belfast City University, London Glasgow Caledonian
University
Glyndw^r University
University College London Cranfield University Kingston University Leeds Trinity & All Saints
University of Birmingham Goldsmiths College,
University of London
Leeds Metropolitan
University
Liverpool Hope University
University of Bristol Heriot-Watt University London Metropolitan
University
Robert Gordon University
University of Cambridge Keele University London South Bank
University
St Mary’s University College
University of Durham Lancaster University Manchester Metropolitan
University
University College
Plymouth St Mark & St John
University of Edinburgh London Business School Middlesex University University of Abertay Dundee
University of Exeter Loughborough University Napier University University of Bedfordshire
University of Glasgow Open University Nottingham Trent
University
University of Bolton
University of Leeds Royal Holloway,
University of London
Oxford Brookes University University of Cumbria
University of Liverpool Swansea University Sheffield Hallam University University of Derby
University of Manchester University of Aberdeen Staffordshire University University of Gloucestershire
University of Newcastle
upon Tyne
University of Bath University of Central
Lancashire
University of Northampton
University of Nottingham University of Bradford University of East London University of Wales Institute,
Cardiff
University of Sheffield University of Dundee University of Glamorgan University of Worcester
University of Southampton University of East Anglia University of Greenwich University of the West of
Scotland
University of Warwick University of Essex University of Hertfordshire York St John University
University of York University of Hull University of Huddersfield
University of Kent University of Lincoln
University of Leicester University of Northumbria
at Newcastle
University of Reading University of Plymouth
University of Salford University of Portsmouth
University of St Andrews University of Sunderland
University of Stirling University of Teesside
University of Strathclyde University of West London
University of Surrey University of Westminster
University of Sussex University of Wolverhampton
UWE
University of Ulster
University of Wales,
Lampeter
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Table A2
Variable Definitions
Variable definitions
Complete University Guide
(CUG) ranking
1.5 weight for research assessment, student satisfaction. 1.0
weight for academic services expenditure per student,
student completion rates, entry standards for undergraduates,
facilities expenditure per student, proportion of students
graduating with firsts and upper seconds, graduate prospects,
student–staff ratio
Available
2008–13
RAE ranking Ranking in research assessment exercise. This was conducted
jointly by the Higher Education Funding Council for
England, the Scottish Funding Council, the Higher
Education Funding Council for Wales and the Department
for Employment and Learning, Northern Ireland. The RAE
produced quality profiles of research activity by academic
department based on individual academic publications,
indicators of esteem and research environment. The profiles
were used to allocate research funding.
Available
2001,
2008
NSS scores ‘Overall I am satisfied with the quality of my course’ (Q22)
Scored from 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly)
Available
2008–12
Academic Ranking of World
Universities (ARWU)
Alumni winning Nobel Prizes and Fields Medals (10%), staff
winning Nobel Prizes and Fields Medals (20%), highly cited
researchers in 21 broad subject categories (20%), articles
published in the journals Nature and Science (20%), the
Science Citation Index and Social Sciences Citation Index
(20%) and the per capita academic performance (on the
indicators above) of an institution (10%)
Available
2003–12
Staff Total number of FTE staff, cost – centre HESA
Number of students Total number of UG + PG students studying the subject HESA
Staff–student ratio HESA
Ac_spending per staff
(z_score)
Expenditure on academic staff (cost centre) divided by FTE
staff; z-score adjusts for department mean and SD
HESA
Professorial salaries (z_score) Yearly wage of professors (cost centre); z-score adjusts for
department mean and SD
HESA
Oth_spending per student
(z_score)
Other spending (cost centre) divided by number of students;
z-score adjusts for department mean and SD
HESA
Perception of UK
competition
Level of competition in the UK (1–10) Survey
Perception of global
competition
Level of competition globally (1–10) Survey
Main competition –
international
Three main competitors includes university outside UK Survey
Main competition – national Three main competitors are national Survey
Main competition – local Three main competitors are all local Survey
Central_ops Whether operations processes are centralised Survey
Central_monitoring Whether performance measurement processes are
centralised
Survey
Central_incentives Whether incentives processes are centralised Survey
Female Whether manager is female Survey
Full-time manager Whether management position is FT Survey
% time on management Percentage time spent on management (If FT, then 100%) Survey
From outside university Whether previous position outside university Survey
From academia Whether previous position academic Survey
Tenure at university Number of years at university Survey
Tenure as head Number of years as head of department Survey
Whether fixed-term Whether management role is fixed-term Survey
Likely next job is academic Sees self next – academic role Survey
Likely next jobs is
management
Sees self next – management role Survey
Likely next job is retirement Sees self next – retirement Survey
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University of Bristol
University of Bristol and Imperial College
University of Bristol
Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this article:
Appendix B. Management Practice Interview Guide.
Data S1.
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